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"No Manifesto"

by James Boyd White
A version of the following article originally appeared in Mercer Law Review,
Spring, 1988; reprinted by permission.
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In this paper I wish to look at the relation between law and literature from the point of
view of the law, and ask: With what hopes and expectations should a lawyer turn to the
reading of imaginative literature? To books and articles that purport to connect that
literature in some way with the law? In particular, is "law and literature" to be thought
of as an academic "field" like law and psychiatry, say, or law and economics? If so,
what can it purport to teach us? If not, how is it to be thought of?
To some it may sound odd even to suggest that meaningful connections could be
drawn be_t~ en two such different things as law and literature. "How can literature
have-:afi
fthing to say to lawyers," such a one might ask, "when literature is inherently
~t individual feelings and perceptions, to be tested by the criteria of authenticity
~r ~d aesthetics, while the law is about the exercise of political power, to be tested by
the criteria of rationality and justice?" To reduce the law to its merely literary aspect
would seem to erase the dimensions of politics, authority, responsibility, power /
the whole sense that the law is about real consequences - and to substitute for it a
kind of empty aestheticism, a celebration of style over substance. Is this what those
who speak of "law and literature" wish to do?
It is mainly to these familiar and perfectly understandable questions that my remarks
here will be addressed, but I will touch on others as well, buried in them as assumptions: What do, or can, we mean by the categories "literature" and "law" themselves,
and by the distinction between them? By "power," "political," and "aesthetic?"
By "style" and its correlative "substance?"

I
In thinking about what lawyers may hope to learn from another discipline, it is natural for us to speak in terms of what I have elsewhere called "findings" or "methods."*
That is, we are accustomed by the conventions of social science to look to another discipline either for the propositions that it establishes about the world (its "findings"),
which we can import directly into the law and found arguments upon, or for its techniques of analysis (its "methods"), which again we can import into the law and put to
our own use. Obviously, the different social sciences speak to us on different subjects,
and offer findings of somewhat different kinds, but as we approach any of them one of
our hopes is to learn a set of propositions about the world - about the working of the
human psyche, about class formation, about the true incidence of a particular tax,
about the rigidity with which social prejudices are held, and so on. Likewise, we hope
to learn from these sciences methods of analysis which we can ourselves employ when
presented with questions that can be thought about in those terms.
Whatever the merits of these ways of thinking about what the social sciences can
offer us - and I shall have something to say about that below - they can obviously be
of little value in forming the hopes and expectations that we should bring to imaginative literature, for no one I think turns to literature for propositions of fact upon which
new policies can be based or for methods of analysis to be employed by lawyers. It is
not that literature has nothing to teach us about the world or about the analysis of texts,
but that it teaches in a different way: it expands one's sympathy, it complicates one's
sense of one's self and the world, it humiliates the instrumentally calculating forms of
reason so dominant in our culture (by demonstrating their dependence on other forms
of thought and expression), and the like. It is one of the deepest characteristics of literary texts to throw into question the nature of the language in which they are written;
this necessarily throws into question as well the nature of any language in which they
might be talked about, or into which they might be translated. fhis in turn means that
these texts are in a deep sense about the inadequacies of the propositional view of language, so dominant in our academic culture, upon which our talk about "findings"
necessarily rests. Literature is art, and its form is essential to its meaning. What it
teaches is indeed about the world, but it is also about ourselves - our minds and
languages - and it is not translatable into propositions of moral or social truth.
Think how differently "learning" is conceived of and talked about in the language
of "findings" and in the language of a literary (or legal) education. When I look for
the "findings" of the natural or social sciences, I think of myself as seeking to acquire
information which will add to my present stock. This information may shift the
sufficiency of the information I already have, but I do not expect it to change me. In
thinking this way I see myself as an observer, for the most part unchanged by the process of observation, making records and reports of what I see. Literary texts do not
work this way at all: they offer engagements the point of which is to change the self to transform one's sense of language, the mind, and the world - and to do this in ways
that systematically resist conversion into other forms of discourse.
To say that literature offers us neither "findings" nor "methods" of the social scientific type is not to say it offers us nothing, or that what it offers can be relegated to
some trivial side of life, as a kind of entertainment or decor - as if what it offered
were about "style" rather than "substance" or "feeling" rather than "thought." It
would be pathetic to think that we had nothing to learn from Sophocles or Shakespeare,
for example, simply because they did not offer us "findings" or "methods" that we
could use in the analysis of legal issues. This would erase the whole value of our high
culture both to us as people and to our profession. To say that we have "much to learn
from literature" but "only as people, not as lawyers," would imply an equally sorry
view of the law and of ourselves, for it suggests that what we do with our minds and
feelings all day is a mere technique, unaffected by our deepest understandings, and a
technique that caps on no significant aspects of the self. On that view, who would want
to become a lawyer?

In thinking about what
lawyers may hope to learn
from another discipline, it
is natural for us to speak
in terms of what I have elsewhere called ''findings'
or "methods."

*Intellectual Integration, Northwestern Law Review I (1987).
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But to say this is not to claim that it is easy to talk about what a literary education
can offer the lawyer or the law. If we are not to use a language of methods and findings, how are we to speak? If neither law nor literature is to be regarded as a kind of
intellectual technology, how are they to be thought of?

II

Literature lives through language, and so must we: the
question is by what art this
is possible, and it is at this
point that literature speaks
most directly to the lawyer,
who is an artist of this kind.

These are difficult questions - one could easily devote a lifetime to them - to
which we should not expect easy or shorthand answers. Literature teaches through the
engagement of one mind with the work of another. What it teaches will emerge not in
new propositions but in the life of the learning mind, in the kinds of engagements it
offers to others. One cannot hope to make an adequate summary statement of that life,
those engagements.
But we do know that what literature teaches will be different for each of us, and that
we must accept responsibility for what we make of our educations of this kind, just as
we accept responsibility for our other conduct and for our characters more generally.
Of people working in this field we should thus expect not uniformity but variety: in
voice, style, and direction of thought; in political values; in fundamental concerns.
Beyond the shared commitment to engage with literary and legal texts (and with each
other) in a wholeminded way, there should be no manifesto of a law and literature
movement.
For me the main direction of literary teaching is towards incrementally more complete, but never wholly adequate, understandings of other people and other minds,
other ways of thinking and being and imagining the world. The classic statement is
George Eliot's:
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist,
is an extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded on generalizations and
statistics require a sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already in
activity; but a picture of life such as a great artist can give, surprises even
the trivial and selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves,
which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment.
This kind of understanding leads us in turn toward a literary rather than conceptual understanding of language, and affects our reading not only <?f "literature" but of all the
texts that make up our world . For again and again in our reading of literature we discover at work an understanding of language that recognizes its incompleteness, its
inadequacies, its gaps, and its imperfections, and does this largely by the continual
recognition of other possibilities. Literature thus puts our language itself into question,
and with it the habits of thought and feeling (and the social and political relations reinforced by those habits) that we have theretofore taken as natural. This affects our
reading not only of "literature" but of all the texts we confront in life; and the literature
from which we can learn, once we begin to learn how, includes the literature we make
and read in our ordinary lives.
What I think literature has most to teach, then, is a way of reading, and reading not
only "literature" but all kinds of texts and expressions: a way of focusing our attention
on the languages we use, on the relations we establish with them, and on the definition
of self and other that is enacted in every expression. It teaches a way of reading that
becomes a way of writing too. Literature lives through language, and so must we: the
question is by what art this is possible, and it is at this point that literature speaks most
directly to the lawyer, who is an artist of this kind .

36

III
Some talk about "law and literature" proceeds on the assumption that what literature
has to offer is a form of high consumption, the sort of pleasure we refer to as "aesthetic," with that word preceded, by implication at least, with a word like "merely." It
can have no inherent moral or political significance. Think of the cultivated Nazis reading and enjoying exquisite poetry while simultaneously degrading their culture and
destroying human beings in almost unimaginable ways. Perhaps literature may teach us
something about "style," regarded as the dressing in which we clothe our thoughts perhaps, for lawyers, with overtones of flattery or seduction - but surely nothing
"substantive."
In my view this position deeply misunderstands reading in general and literature
in particular, for the literary texts here marginalized as merely "aesthetic" are I think
deeply imbued with political and ethical meanings, meanings we must be prepared
to understand and to judge. But these meanings are not coercive - they do not force
themselves on every unwilling mind with equal force - and our readings can be perverted or twisted, just as our other activities can. It is no argument against poetry that
evil men have sometimes loved what they found there. We are responsible for the ways
in which we attune ourselves to what we read, for how we judge it, and for who we
become in relation to it.
But the pressure of any literature worthy of the name is always against such abuse.
The maker of literature uses the language of his culture to create something new, a new
set of experiences or a new place from which that language and the culture itself can
be seen afresh and criticized. The effort is to bring the reader to the edge of language,
where it can, sometimes, be seen by the mind that uses it in the split second before it
dominates the world. In this fundamental sense literature is integrative: insisting upon
the incorporation of what a particular language or tradition or s~t of ideas leaves out,
upon unstated or opposing truths. It thus inherently values a multiplicity of voices and
the self that can hear them. Multivocality is not merely an aesthetic value but a political one; literature is accordingly antisystematic, antibureaucratic, and antiauthoritarian
by nature. In this sense its true "lessons" are very nearly the opposite of what some
people hope from it - those who speak as if the "wisdom of the past" will tell us
what to do. It is a degradation to reduce the reading of such texts to a form of high
consumption.
The view that what literature has to teach us, as people or as lawyers, is reducible to
"style" is an empty one too, for what is dismissed as mere "style" is actually central to
the intellectual substance of a text. It is here, in the transformations of language, in the
establishment of relations with the reader, that everything of value in the text actually
happens. To claim that "the lawyer has nothing to learn from literature except with
respect to style" would in my view demean all the central terms of that sentence "lawyer" (and "law"), "literature," "learn," and "style" - and with them our own
capacities for thought and life. The real question is, "Who are we in our relations
to our languages and to each other?" The answer, the deepest kind of "substance,"
is to be found only in our "style," in our actual performances.
A related mistake is to claim that the literary view of law fails to see that law is about
power. Actually, to learn to read in the way I describe is to expose the root of power,
which is linguistic and ideological in nature. Whoever controls our languages has the
greatest power of all. Think, for example, of what we think of as state power- the
exercise of physical force or violence by the police or the army - the kind of "real
power" to which the literary mind is supposed to be blind. This is a physical power,
"real power," only because it is a political power; that is, only because people agree to
inhabit a particular linguistic universe and to be controlled by it. In some sense, power
comes from the muzzle of a gun; but this power is dependent upon another, which lies
in the social arrangements by which people organize guns, and themselves with respect
to guns. This kind of power is rhetorical, a form of persuasion and acquiescence it always rests upon texts of one kind of another - and it can be studied as it is
exercised, linguistically and culturally.

To learn to read in the way
I describe is to expose the root of
power, which is linguistic and
ideological in nature. Whoever
controls our languages has the
greatest power of all.

The maker of literature uses
the language of his culture
to create something new, a
new set of experiences or a
new place, from which that
language and culture
itself can be seen afresh
and criticized.
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The central question for us
as lawyers is how legal power
ought to be exercised: upon
what conception of oneself,
of the litigants, of ones audience, of the prior texts that
bear upon the case, of the
culture of argument that is
the law.

In this sense power is everywhere. What is special and important about legal power
is that it is a claim to authority; that is, a claim to exercise power that is itself justified
by arrangements external to the actor. This is what distinguishes it from violence. This
is a distinction that those who look through meaning to the simple act of force cannot
perceive or express, yet it is the distinction upon which legitimate government rests. It
is the difference between a judge and a thug, between a marshall carrying out an arrest
under a warrant and a lynch mob; it is the difference between legal force and mere violence; and it is a difference that lies, at bottom, in the respect that is paid to decisions
made by others, or to what I have called arrangments external to the actors themselves.
These arrangements are always texts, or treated as texts, and for their authority to be
real - rather than merely a brutal authoritarian order - these texts must be both conceived of and read in certain specific ways, in the ways of the law. In this sense the true
test of authority is literary in character.
Of course legal texts are not "merely aesthetic" texts, to be read for sheer delight,
but neither are literary texts in my view simply that; legal texts involve the exercise of
power by one person over another, as poems do not, but the criteria by which we can
judge such exercises is in a deep sense literary, for it is in reading of these texts that one
may find the meaning of the judicial act, including the act of power, most fully illuminated. The central question for us as lawyers is how legal power ought to be exercised:
upon what conception of oneself, of the litigants, of one's audience, of the prior texts
that bear upon the case, of the culture of argument that is the law. Real-world answers
to such questions cannot be merely theoretical in character but must be performative,
actual enactments in the texts; criticism should be particular too, the analysis of the
textual and political communities that a particular argument or opinion creates in its
performances of language.
But upon what can our criticism be grounded? Not upon a universally shared ontology, certainly not upon a theoretical system, but upon the identities and relations we
ourselves create in our written and other conversations with each other. We can try to
look to the reality of the world "out there," perhaps using the languages of social science, or common sense - or even literature, in a different mode - to do so. But the
reality we see is not uncreated, not language-free, and we are as responsible for what
we see and say when we look out to the world as we are when we speak as lawyers and
judges. There is no basis external to ourselves and our communities upon which we
can rest. The ground of judgment must be created by each of us, and by us collectively,
in the way we talk with each other; this talking should itself be criticized in the terms
on which we propose to criticize others. In this sense not only our questions, but our
answers, should be literary.

IV
Think back now to the brief account of the social sciences I gave at the beginning of
this paper - each generating its findings by its own methods and offering them for our
use. These findings and methods are often in conflict with each other, and none can address the central legal question, namely the character of our obligation to judgments
made by others. How then can these findings and methods be put to work in the context of the law? This no science can tell us, except in its own terms , recommending its
insights, truths, and techniques as superior to all others. None can recognize what lies
outside itself; none invites a reader to speak simultaneously its language and some
other language, a language that undercuts or qualifies it by exposing its limits, its dead
spots, its uncertainties.
This is to suggest that the very language of interdisciplinary work with which I began, and which is so familiar and natural to us - the talk of "findings" and "methods"
- is in fact deeply inadequate not only to "law and literature" but to intelligent interdisciplinary work of any kind, which necessarily requires a negotiation of the relation
between languages of a kind for which these disciplines have no place. This is not to
say that we cannot learn from the "findings" and "methods" of various social sciences,
but that this learning is far more difficult than such language suggests.
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One way to look at the social sciences is as ways of framing the world. The frame of
one can include the other: thus, we have a history of economics, an economics of history, a sociology of psychology, and psychology of sociology, and so on. But how is the
process of framing itself to be thought about and spoken of, especially when we recognize the existence of competing and inconsistent frames? This is a problem of language
and discourse, or what I call a literary problem; the very process of interdisciplinary
work itself thus requires an art fundamentally literary in character, perhaps best described as a kind of translation.

v
What the habitual reading of literature offers is not a set of propositions or a method
leading to a set of results, but the experience of directing one's attention to a plane or
dimension of reality that is normally difficult or impossible to focus upon, namely the
linguistic and ethical plane, where we remake in our texts both our languages and ourselves. To the literary mind language is not simply transparent - a way of talking
about objects or concepts in the world - but is itself a part of the world; it is not an instrument that "I" use in communicating ideas to " you" but a way in which I am , or
make myself, in relation to you. The literary text offers its reader not information or
ideas but an experience of language, a contact with a living mind, of a sort that will
erode forever the confidence with which we are otherwise likely to talk about "information" or "ideas" or "communication." The texts that do this are not only those
taught in "literature" courses - some of which are in this sense not literary at all but all texts that lead us to the point of selfconsdiousness about our language and the
relations we create in our use of them. It is not so much literary theory, which often operates on nonliterary premises, that will teach us in this active way, but literary practice
- the practice of reading and of writing.
..
When our attention is once drawn to this dimension of life, we come to see that the
heart of justice is not the distribution of nonlinguistic items in the world, but ethical
and relational: it lies in the attitude, and in the capacity of mind, by which authoritative
texts are read and interpreted; in the kind of attention given to opposing claims and to
the experiences of opposing parties; in the quality of openness (or closedness) to new
formulations, new voices; in the sense that the judicial or legal opinion is an ethical and
political, as well as an intellectual, text for which the mind composing it is responsible.
Thought of this kind does not by itself tell us how to read a particular case or statute,
and in that sense does not dictate results; instead, it keeps us aware of the degree to
which results are not dictated but chosen, and of the importance to us of a legal culture
that is engaged in the process of educating itself and the public by the sincere and selfcritical way it addresses the questions that come before it. Attention of this kind will
surely lead us to different results, but not mechanically so; and it will lead us as well to
different ways of finding meaning in the results we do reach.
Therefore we cannot expect the "law and literature movement" to tell us how to decide cases or to teach us lessons or to offer us a technology that might supplant the law.
We should instead expect, or hope, for variety, for the distinct sounds of a thousand
voices, for the perpetual affirmation of the individual mind as it seeks community
with others. This kind of work cannot be done bureaucratically, mechanistically,
or incrementally. It must be done anew each time.
I began this paper by asking this question, meant to capture the essence of many
such questions I have heard: "How can literature have anything to say to lawyers when
literature is inherently about the expression of individual feelings and perceptions, to
be tested by the criteria of authenticity and aesthetics, while law is about the exercise
of political power, to be tested by the criteria of rationality and justice?" I hope the
reader can now see something of what I mean when I say that this question misstates
everything it touches. Literature and law are both about reason and emotion, politics
and aesthetics; they both promise to integrate what the question falsely separates, and
to do so by drawing attention to what is at stake whenever one person writes or talks
to another.

James Boyd White, the L. Hart Wright
Professor of Law, is also professor of
English and adjunct professor of classical studies at Michigan. A graduate of
Amherst College, Harvard Law School,
and Harvard Graduate School, he has
taught at the U-M since 1983.

39

